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Chemical weapons, like all military technology, are associated with activities of scientists and en-
gineers. However, chemical weapons differ from any other military technology because they
were invented, and their first mass use directly developed by famous chemists. The active contri-
bution of engineers and scientists and their organisations in the negotiations on chemical disarma-
ment, including drafting the Chemical Weapons Convention, is described. Their present and
future role in implementing the Convention is analysed, taking into consideration the threats and
benefits of advances in science and technology, and stressing the independent expertise of the
OPCW Scientific Advisory Board.
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Introduction
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction, referred to briefly as the Convention
on General and Comprehensive Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, or Chemical Weapons Convention, abbreviated
as CWC, was adopted in 1992 after negotiations at the
Conference on Disarmament (and previous multilateral ne-
gotiating fora in Geneva) which lasted nearly a quarter of a
century. The delays were due not only to the then current
East-West confrontation and the Cold War but also to the
worldwide spread of the chemical industry and the relati-
vely easy possibility of clandestine synthesis of chemical
warfare agents in militarily-relevant quantities. This expe-
rience, and also experience with weak points of the pre-
viously adopted Convention on the Prohibition of Deve-
lopment, Production and Stockpiling Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxin Weapons and of Their Destruction
(BTWC),** which lacked any objective verification mecha-
nisms, has been reflected in very careful definitions and cri-
teria, defining purposes not prohibited by the CWC, and a
very complex and effective verification system. This is a very
sophisticated and by no doubt also the best elaborated di-
sarmament document that totally outlaws one important
and very dangerous kind of weapon of mass destruction
(WMD). It commits States Parties (SP) to eliminate their
chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles and production facilities
(CWPF). Both Review Conferences (2003 and 2008) repor-
ted generally good acceptance by the international com-
munity, showed positive results of implementation of the
CWC provisions, and outlined future actions.
Any arms control document, as for any functioning disar-
mament agreement, even if it is primarily a document of in-
ternational law, is much more than just a legal document; it
has political, military, military technological, military poli-
tical, scientific and technological, economic, ethical and
such like aspects also. It can be adopted and implemented
only as a result of wide consensus of the international com-
munity, while it cannot exist without expertise in all the
above-mentioned areas.
The coherent formulation and concise regime of the CWC
reflects the extremely valuable and effective contributions
of well informed and concerned engineers and scientists
and their national and international professional organisa-
tions. The latter include NGOs mainly in chemistry, chemi-
cal technology and allied branches associated with the
development, production, use and protection against CW
and other WMD. This paper describes the efforts made by
the scientific and technological community to achieve a ve-
rifiable total and comprehensive ban of CW from the start
of negotiations about the CWC, discusses activities involved
in implementing the CWC as well as future tasks arising
from the impact of scientific and technological develop-
ment.
The Route to the Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Contribution
of the International Community
of Engineers and Scientists
Beside the positive role of engineers and scientists in any
arms control and disarmament issue, their negative role
should also be mentioned. Any weaponry must have been
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designed by scientists and engineers at the relevant stages of
scientific and technological development in their professio-
nal service in order to solve concrete demands for develo-
ping the technology of warfare. Mass use of chemical wea-
pons could emerge only in the era of a chemical industry
capable of delivering enough quantity of toxic chemicals
(initially chlorine and phosgene) routinely produced as ba-
sic raw materials for syntheses of organic chemicals (origi-
nally organic dyestuffs). This prerequisite was most deve-
loped in Germany, which produced more than 90 per cent
of the world production of synthetic dyestuffs in the second
decade of the 20th century. The possibility of misusing this
potential for weaponry was actually transformed into reality
just shortly after the initial stage of the First World War
(WW I) when the movements of big armies were stopped in
the mud of the trenches. This was the impetus for develo-
ping new weapons able to overcome field fortifications.
Chemical weapons with their widespread effects appeared
on battlefields exactly at that time.
It is typical, maybe only for chemical weapons, that they
were not developed by any order of the military, and in this
case also not following a wish of Emperor Wilhelm II. Rat-
her, the first use of pernicious chemicals* had been desi-
gned and developed from the original idea of scientists. The
actual ‘Father of Chemical Warfare’ was Professor Fritz Ha-
ber (later Nobel laureate in chemistry for the synthesis of
ammonia), then director of the Emperor Wilhelm Institute
of Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin-Dah-
lem. He put together a staff of excellent scientists (among
them some well-known Nobel laureates) – James Franck,
Gustav Hertz, Wilhelm Westphal and Richard Wilstätter –
for designing scientifically the first use of chemical wea-
pons. Industry was also represented – Professor Carl Dui-
sberg, director of IG-Farben, was also a member of this
group under Haber’s personal leadership. The idea for the
first use (called Blasangriff in German) was the release on a
wide front of gaseous chlorine from steel bottles.
There is another interesting piece of evidence for the perso-
nal responsibility of Fritz Haber. Emperor Wilhelm asked
Haber whether Germany’s international obligations would
be breached by such use. It should be noted that the Decla-
ration of the Peace Conference in The Hague, signed on
July 29, 1899, contained an obligation for States Parties
“not to use such projectiles, the only purpose of them is to
disseminate asphyxiating or deleterious gases”. Furthermo-
re, the Appendix of the IV Convention on the Principles of
War on Land, signed in The Hague in 1907, contained in its
Article 23 explicit prohibition of “use of poison or poisoned
weapons”.
Haber convinced the Emperor that “no munitions would be
used”; thereby any doubts were diverted and preparations
continued. Their result was the first mass use of chemical
weapons by the Germans at Ieper (Ypres) in West Flanders
on April 22, 1915, with the release of 168 metric tonnes of
gaseous chlorine from steel bottles. The effect of this first act
of chemical warfare was horrible: 15,000 casualties, among
them 5,000 lethal ones, on the side of the British, French
and Belgian Allies. By walking behind the green-greyish
toxic plume, the German infantry penetrated 4 km into the
depth of the enemy’s defence positions without firing a
single shot. However, the military effect was greater than
expected, so that chlorine was not utilised to try to break
through the full depth of the Entente’s defence system. Ha-
ving seen a new effective weaponry being used, none of the
belligerents protested against chemical warfare. Quite the
opposite: all other major belligerents, mostly SPs to the
above-mentioned agreements (France, Russia, Austria–
–Hungary, Italy, USA), gradually accepted this mode of
warfare. Only the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) protested in its appeal of 1918 against chemical
weapons that became standard weapons in many other
countries after WW I.
Shortly after constituting its foundation as the first universal
international organisation, The League of Nations initiated
the first negotiations for outlawing chemical weapons.
The first modern valid arms control document, the Protocol
banning use in war of asphyxiating and other toxic gases
and bacteriological methods of warfare,** prohibited only
the use of chemical weapons but not material preparations
for chemical warfare. This left open the possibility of retalia-
tion-in-kind, and has been shown not to be an effective in-
strument for prohibiting any CW use. The Protocol was
violated by some of its SPs several times, starting with the
use in 1935 of CW by Italy (incidentally the first country to
have ratified it) in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, by Japan in
China from 1937, and later by Iraq in the Iraq–Iran War in
the 1980s. This Protocol was generally considered as prohi-
biting only the first use of such weapons because about one
third of signatories ratified it with the reservation that they
would not be bound by it in the case of the first use of CW
by an adversary or its allies.
In the post-WW II era, the UN General Assembly started
discussions on the total and comprehensive ban of chemi-
cal and biological weapons as early as 1946. The nego-
tiations were commenced at the multilateral negotiating
body, the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee in
Geneva, and continued in its successor bodies until the la-
ter Conference on Disarmament (CD). The first efforts ad-
dressed both chemical and biological weapons but in the
late 1960s the problem of biological weapons was separa-
ted off, as the latter was then (i. e. in the time of the classical
era of biological warfare, when its possible military value
had been underestimated) considered as more easily sol-
ved. This enabled relatively quick adoption of the BTWC in
1972, though with all its gaps and weaknesses as mentio-
ned above.
The discussions and further negotiations on the main points
of the future CWC started in the 1970s, while the deeper
negotiations on its structure and contents commenced in
the early 1980s. The CD had been precisely mandated by
the UN General Assembly since 1984. The complex nego-
tiations then lasted until 1992, after exploring many side-
tracks, reflecting not only inherent difficulties of this issue
but also the impact of the final years of the Cold War and
East-West confrontation.
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The input of scientific and technological communities into
the negotiations was undoubtedly crucial. Beside the perso-
nal engagement of military, scientific, technological and le-
gal experts working in the national delegations who took an
active part in the negotiations, with their backgrounds sup-
ported by domestic research institutes, academia, universi-
ties, industrial organisations and associations, and state of-
fices, several prestigious international professional organisa-
tions of concerned scientists and engineers also contributed
to the negotiations from their start.
Among the prestigious international and leading national
(research) institutes, organisations and programmes making
major contributions to discussing the problems of CW and
BTW, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) occupies the prime position. SIPRI was founded to
commemorate 150 years of unbroken peace in Sweden
and it is known worldwide for its impressive research and
publication activity. Its Chemical and Biological (CB) War-
fare Programme began in the late 1960s and is now one of
SIPRI’s longest running programmes. Analyses devoted to
various actual problems of chemical (CW) and biological
and toxin weapons (BTW), and progress in BTWC and
CWC negotiations and later in their implementation can be
found in the respective chapters of all published SIPRI Year-
books (since the first 1968/69) as well as in the series of CB
Warfare Studies started in 1985, a couple of other previous
and parallel books and other non-serial publications on va-
rious aspects of CW and BTW. These sources have been wi-
dely utilised as serious and fully reliable reference infor-
mation by the whole community dealing with CB disarma-
ment. The second most important programme relating to
the old chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program-
me was obviously the Harvard Sussex Programme, which
edited the quarterly CBW Conventions Bulletin (originally
named CWC Convention Bulletin), another serious referen-
ce source on chronology, news, background information
and comment on CBTW problems. The other institute
worth naming is the United Nations Institute for Disarma-
ment Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva.
There are also other programmes contributing to CB wea-
pons issues that have been active mainly in the last decade.
Among these one cannot overlook the NATO Partnership
for Peace Programme nor the NATO Programme for Secu-
rity through Science that have organised frequent Advan-
ced Research Workshops devoted to various aspects of CB
disarmament and have also undertaken relevant educatio-
nal activities. Among the national institutes and organisati-
ons known for their activities in organising periodic inter-
national conferences, congresses and symposia devoted to
the issues of CB warfare, the prime position belongs to the
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI, but previously the
Swedish Defence Research Establishment FOA) which or-
ganises the CBW Protection Symposia in Stockholm every
three years. These meetings constitute the biggest worldwi-
de gathering of specialists on this topic, the latest having ta-
ken place in Gothenburg in 2007. A similar, slightly smaller
NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) event is organised
also every three years in Finland by the chemical defence
organisations, the latest being the 7th (NBC–2009) in Jyväs-
kylä. A related periodic gathering in the Asia/Pacific region,
organised since the late 1990s by the defence institutions in
Singapore, is known as SISPAT. One cannot overlook the
very active US organisation with links worldwide, Applied
Science and Analysis (ASA) Inc., which organises the annual
series of Chemical and Biological Medical Treatment Sym-
posia (CBMTS), the first being in Spiez, Switzerland in 1994
and the recent ones dealing with CBR (chemical, biological
and radiological) terrorism. This organisation also edits the
ASA Newletter, which has been an important information
source on various aspects of NBC protection and related
problems for two decades. A very important series of sym-
posia fully devoted to the destruction of CW, i. e. CW de-
militarisation, is organised yearly by the British Defence
Scien- ce and Technology Laboratories (Dstl). Another insti-
tute worth mentioning is the Illinois Institute of Technology
Research Institute (IITRI) which has since 1996 organised
four workshops on CB Agents – Detection and Decontami-
nation (three in Chicago, USA, one in Brno, Czech Republic
headed by the author). It is impossible not to mention the
valuable contribution of the International Union of Pure
and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) which in recent years has
worked on destruction technologies. It has also worked on
the actual problems of the impact of scientific and techno-
logical development on the CWC, including the deve-
lopments in synthetic chemistry, problems of the changing
face of chemical industry, developments in analytical che-
mistry, and verification issues. This latter issue is deeply stu-
died also by the Verification Research, Training and Infor-
mation Centre (VERTIC), an organisation that deals with all
aspects of verification. It is impossible to name all the orga-
nisations and institutes that make positive input but associa-
tions of chemical industry should be mentioned also.
Among the prestigious international NGOs representing the
community of scientists and engineers with an active input
into CBW disarmament issues, pride of place belongs to the
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, fo-
unded in 1957. Especially engaged in critical discussions
and open exchange of views and standpoints has been the
Pugwash Study Group on CB Disarmament, linking inde-
pendent experts with negotiators in the CD at meetings
convened at least once a year since the 1960s, mostly in
Geneva, then also latterly in the Netherlands. Several joint
SIPRI-Pugwash publications also contributed strongly to the
formulation of the CWC. In the mid–1990s this forum was
renamed the Pugwash Study Group on Implementation of
the Chemical (1993) and Biological (1972) Weapons Con-
ventions. Meetings continue normally twice a year, asses-
sing all urgent aspects of implementation of the two Con-
ventions, including identifying threats of scientific and tech-
nological development on the futures of both the CWC and
BTWC.
Another worldwide NGO of concerned scientists that made
major contributions mainly in the time when the CWC was
being negotiated is the World Federation of Scientific Wor-
kers (WFSW), which then had a very large membership.
The WFSW edited the Journal Scientific World, and its Stan-
ding Committee on Disarmament published two studies on
the threat of chemical weapons and chemical disarmament
(1983, 1986). Each of these studies was published in four
languages (English, French, German and Russian), and were
edited in London, Paris, Berlin and Moscow (with the aut-
hor’s contribution). Total and comprehensive prohibition of
CW has also been among the main goals of the Internatio-
nal Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Respon-
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sibility (INES). This organisation was founded in 1991, with
member organisations in about 60 countries on all conti-
nents. It contributes to the CW ban through its Working
Group on Chemical Weapons (convened by the author), by
dealing with this problem at INES events (for example the
Workshop on CB disarmament at the INES Congress in Am-
sterdam, 1996), by the activities of its Council and Executi-
ve Committee, and by appealing to Parliaments to acce-
lerate the ratification process to achieve the entry into force
of the CWC in 1995. Important also are the links between,
and representation of, the above-mentioned NGOs (mainly
the WFSW) in the respective NGO Committees working in
the headquarters of the United Nations (in New York,
Vienna, and Geneva) to influence their engagement in the
CB issues.
It is impossible to mention all institutions and organisations
contributing to the CW ban (including also, for example,
Greenpeace International and Green Cross) but there is no
doubt that without the engaged expertise of concerned
professionals and their organisations, and state, public and
private, national and international organisations and fora
including NGOs, a document as sophisticated as the CWC
could not exist at all.
Chemical Weapons Convention – Basic Facts
The Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signature
in Paris, on January 13, 1993 and entered into force on
April 29, 1997. Its complexity is reflected in almost 200 pa-
ges of text, containing a Preamble, 24 Articles and three An-
nexes: On Chemicals (6 pp), On Implementation and Ve-
rification (105 pp), On Protection of Confidential Informa-
tion (5 pp).1
The main pillars of the CWC are:
– Verified destruction of chemical weapons and CW pro-
duction facilities; (CWPF), i. e. disarmament.
– Verified non-production of CW, i. e. non-proliferation.
– Assistance and protection.
– International cooperation.
The spirit of this Convention, significantly influenced by
scientific expertise, lies inter alia mainly in the method of
defining the scope of the prohibition. The CWC is rather
purpose- than chemical compound-oriented. This means
that it is nothing like a list of prohibited compounds, as
some less informed people might expect. The Convention’s
leading principle, which is often reported as the General
Purpose Criterion (GPC), is contained in the wording of Ar-
ticle II, paragraph 1, defining the purposes of the CWC
among ‘Chemical Weapons’:
“Article II DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. “Chemical Weapons” means the following, together or
separately:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where in-
tended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such
purposes.
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause.
…
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use…”.
Under purposes non-prohibited by the Convention accor-
ding to Article II, paragraph 2 (a) – (d) are understood:
“industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical
or other purposes, protective purposes, namely those di-
rectly related to protection against toxic chemicals,
“military purposes not connected with the use of CW and
not dependent on the use of toxic properties of chemicals
as a method of warfare as well as law enforcement inclu-
ding domestic riot control”.
Toxic chemicals are further defined in Article II paragraph 2
as meaning:
“Any chemical which through its chemical action on life
processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or
permanent harm to humans and animals. This includes all
such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method
of production and regardless of whether they are produced
in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere”.
From this explanation quoting relevant articles of the CWC,
it is evident, consistent with the above-mentioned GPC,
that the Convention is nothing like a list of prohibited com-
pounds. It covers any toxic chemical intended to be used
for chemical warfare (and therefore developed, produced
and stockpiled), pursuant to Article II, paragraph 1 (a) and
paragraph 2, even those not yet synthesised. This means
that the CWC is open-ended and the prohibition covers
any future scientific and technological development. In ot-
her words the Convention is ipso facto protected against the
results of scientific and technological development.
The most important toxic chemicals and their precursors
endangering the CWC are listed within three Schedules,
constituted according to the risk the chemicals pose for the
Convention. Schedule 1 contains super-toxic lethal chemi-
cals and key precursors that have no peaceful uses, Schedu-
le 2 contains dual-use dangerous toxic chemicals and pre-
cursors produced in small quantities, and Schedule 3 lists
toxic industrial chemicals that have been used for chemical
weapons and their precursors and produced on a mass
scale.
A frequent misunderstanding is to consider the Schedules
as something like lists of ‘prohibited compounds’, although
it is explicitly stated in the CWC that “Schedules do not
constitute a definition of CW”. However, the open-ended
prohibition does not mean that toxic chemicals (including
other than those contained in the Schedules) cannot appear
on battlefields being used by non-States Parties, or less pos-
sibly by SPs breaching the CWC, or more possibly by terro-
rist groups.
That is why scientific and technological development has to
be very carefully watched, international verification measu-
res extended, national authorities and operation systems
established, and respective legislation adopted in order to
enable prevention and an adequate and immediate res-
ponse (repression, protection, rescue and recovery) in cases
of emergency.
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Implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Role of the International
Community of Engineers and Scientists*
Facts about the Implementation of the CWC
At present, there are 188 States Parties to the Convention. It
is important that the Convention includes all P5** members
of UN Security Council and the vast majority of states with
declarable CWC facilities.
Seven SPs (Russia, USA, India, Albania, South Korea, Libya
and Iraq) declared possession of chemical weapons.
Among SPs, there are 13 possessors of former (post 1946)
CW production facilities: Russia, USA, India, South Korea,
Libya, France, UK, China, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Bosnia & Her-
cegovina and Serbia & Montenegro (the last two SPs decla-
red one – i. e. the same – production facility).
The CWC implementation and verification regime now co-
vers over 98 % of the world’s population, but what is more
important, 98 % of the world’s chemical industry.
Reviewing the figure for the number of SPs, it is also impor-
tant to note that there are 2 signatory states (inter alia Israel)
that have not yet ratified the Convention and altogether 5
countries that have not even signed it. In addition to less im-
portant states it should be noted that to the non-signatories
group belongs the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
and also that the neighbours of Israel (Egypt and Syria)
made their signatures conditional on Israel’s abandoning its
nuclear weapons programme. Assessing the universality of
the CWC (which is one of the requirements of the First Re-
view Conference), it is interesting to compare the signatory
states with those of other principal agreements on weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) as shown by Table 1.
It seems that one could be satisfied with the relatively high
number of SPs twelve years after entry into force, in com-
parison with other arms-control/disarmament agreements.
Nevertheless, for the prevention of any use of CW, it is ne-
cessary to attain a higher number of SPs mainly because
some of the above-mentioned important non-signatories
concentrated in the Near and Middle East and on the Ko-
rean peninsula are likely possessors of CW (not to speak of
possession of another WMD in the case of Israel and North
Korea).
The most important data from the declarations of SPs (see
Table 2) show the worldwide problems arising from the
possession, storage and former production of CW, as well
as from the spread of chemical industry. These problems
affect not only the destruction of CW at present and in the
near future but also the monitoring of the non-production
of CW in the chemical industry in the future.
Verification of the destruction of CW stockpiles and of CW
production facilities, as well as verification of non-produc-
tion of CW by the peaceful chemical industry, is the con-
cern of the main pillars of the Convention. The total num-
ber of sites declared by SPs that must be regularly or ran-
domly inspected (over 5800) shows the heavy burden of
necessary verification activities. At this stage of implementa-
tion, the inspections have been obviously concentrated on
checking declarations, inspecting storage sites and destruc-
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* If it is not otherwise stated, the data are reported as of November 30,
2009.
** At the same time the nuclear weapons states recognised under the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
T a b l e 1 – Universality: CWC compared with other main
agreements on WMD
T a b l i c a 1 – Univerzalnost Konvencije o kemijskom oruÞju u
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T a b l e 2 – Important data from the declarations by the SPs
(as of November 30, 2009)






























Kemikalije s Popisa 1
22 27
Schedule 2 chemicals
Kemikalije s Popisa 2
38 456
Schedule 3 chemicals





* Of the 65 reported (former) CWPFs, 62 certified as already destroyed
(43) or converted for peaceful purposes (19)
* Od ukupno (ranije) deklariranih 70 lokacija za proizvodnju kem. oruÞja,
62 su potvrðena kao veæ uništena (43) ili prenamijenjena u mirne svrhe
(19)
tion of CW stockpiles and CW production facilities and, in
the chemical industry, on facilities producing scheduled
chemicals.
At present, the most important task is undoubtedly destruc-
tion of CW:
Declared chemical agents: 71,194 metric tonnes
Destroyed: 39,585 metric tonnes
(i. e. 55.6 %)
Declared munitions (containers) 8.67 million items
Destroyed 3.93 million items
(i. e. 45.3 %)
As expected, the destruction proceeds asymmetrically, with
construction of destruction facilities meeting with domestic
financial and technological difficulties and acceptance pro-
blems by local populations.
The scheduled 10 year term set by the CWC for total CW
destruction has not been met, and an allowed exemption to
extend the destruction period for another 5 years has alrea-
dy been agreed for the Russian Federation and for the US. It
seems now that it will be difficult for the latter SP to meet
even the extended deadline for total destruction. On the
other hand, Albania and South Korea had already finished
destruction of their small stockpiles in 2008, as had India in
2009.
Table 3 overviews the inspection activities. If we relate de-
clared sites to inspection frequency, it is obvious that the
main effort has been concentrated on checking declara-
tions submitted by the SPs concerning the closed storage
and production facilities, and to ongoing processes of CW
destruction.
Somewhat less attention has been devoted to the industry
that produces scheduled chemicals. In future, when all CW
stockpiles have been destroyed, the inspection effort will be
focused on industry. For the reasons explained in the chap-
ters in this book* dealing with the impact of scientific and
technological development on the Convention, it seems
that potential threats stem mainly from the industry pro-
ducing discrete organic chemicals. This is because of the
changing face of the chemical industry and new deve-
lopments in organic synthesis that are able to deliver new
unscheduled toxic chemicals with incredible rapidity, so-
mething which was not expected when the Convention was
drafted. That is why the inspection effort devoted to this
part of industry seems to be low; it is restricted by the
limited numbers of inspection personnel. The high number
of such facilities worldwide (about 5600) as compared with
the number of inspected facilities (up till now something
over 1600, most of which have been inspected only once)
clearly indicates the necessity to increase the focus on this
type of site. The limited personnel capacity of inspection
teams could be enhanced through two means. First, there
could be considerable economising in the (till now con-
tinuous on-site) inspections at the destruction of CW stock-
piles, which nowadays are regulated also by stringent do-
mestic legislation dealing with both security and safety,
namely health and workplace safety, and environmental
protection. Secondly there could be increased utilisation of
the capabilities of control and analytical instrumentation
and other relevant information technology, including
equipment for continuous checking, remote and off-site
sensing, perimeter watching and observation, data record-
ing, data transmission in real time, central data processing
etc.
T a b l e 3 – Inspection activities (as of November 30, 2009)





























Kemikalije s Popisa 1
36 202
Schedule 2 chemicals
Kemikalije s Popisa 2
254 486
Schedule 3 chemicals





* 81 SPs have been inspected
* Inspekcije su obuhvatile 81 Zemlju-èlanicu
Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons – OPCW
Pursuant to the CWC, after its signature, the Preparatory
Commission was founded and after its entry into force, the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) was established, with its headquarters in The Ha-
gue, The Netherlands.2
The Organisation consists of three main elements: Confe-
rence of the States Parties, Executive Council and Technical
Secretariat.
With regard to the topic of this paper, it is necessary to stress
the important role of the main subsidiary body. This is the
OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). Consisting of 25 in-
dependent experts (from SPs), it plays a crucial role in advi-
sing the Technical Secretariat and the Director-General on
issues of scientific and technological development having
actual or potential impact on the CWC and its implementa-
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tion. The SAB solves important issues by utilising broader
scientific expertise, organising Temporary Working Groups
(TWG) and launching some projects in cooperation with,
for example, the International Union of Pure and Applied
Chemistry. It also takes active part in other workshops and
fora organised by the OPCW, and cooperates with specific
organs of the OPCW.
Main Results of Both CWC Review Conferences
The aim and tasks for the First Review Conference (2003)
were determined as follows:
– Review operations of the Convention.
– Take account of scientific and technological deve-
lopment.
– Lessons learned and recommendation for future imple-
mentation.
It was not an amendment (revision) conference.
The attendance represented 113 (then) SPs, two signatory
states (Haiti, Israel), two non-signatory states (Libya, Ango-
la), five international organisations – the European Space
Agency (ESA), ICRC, the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation
(CTBTO) and UNIDIR – 22 NGOs and six industry associa-
tions. Despite a somewhat provocative statement by the US
alleging non-compliance by Iran and concerns about the
Sudan, the Conference did not collapse into disarray and
the CWC has not met the fate of BTWC.* The Conference
did not result in radical change of direction for the OPCW
or make substantive decisions on crucial, still outstanding is-
sues (e. g. so called ‘non-lethal’ agents, riot control agents,
‘law enforcement’, nil declarations in respect of OCPFs and
other problems).
However, a number of priorities were clearly recognised.
These included:
– Universality of the Convention.
– National implementation measures.
– International cooperation and assistance.
– Verification regime for the chemical industry.
– Optimisation of verification measures.
– Scientific and technological development.
– Functioning of the OPCW.
Detailed explanation of these priorities is beyond the aim of
this paper. For further information the adopted documents
can be consulted. First there is the political declaration con-
taining 23 paragraphs3 and the main written result – the re-
view document with 134 paragraphs.4 Except for many
mostly general statements, the programme did not go too
deeply into the problems of the impact of scientific and
technological development on the CWC that are obviously
relevant to its future implementation. That issue was howe-
ver deeply analysed in the document prepared by the
OPCW Scientific Advisory Board and introduced to the
Conference in the Note by the Director-General.5
For the present status of the CWC’s implementation, the
developments between the 1st and the 2nd Review Confe-
rences were of utmost importance.
Some of recommendations of the OPCW SAB are reflected
in the SAB’s recent advice, and especially in projects that
have been launched recently. It is generally expected that
their results will influence the present and future activities
of the OPCW, considering the crucial importance of the im-
pact of scientific and technological development on the
CWC, especially after current CW stockpiles have been de-
stroyed. Recent advice and recommendations by the SAB
are related to:
– Salts of scheduled chemicals (of the same toxicological
importance as free bases).
– Captive use of (scheduled) chemicals (generally not im-
portant for possible misuse).
– Structure of ricin (A + B chains, connected by disulphide
crosslinking).
– Role of the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) figures (only
an auxiliary tool, with no regulatory power).
The ongoing projects under the aegis of the OPCW SAB in-
clude:
– Biomedical Sampling and Analysis (in investigating alle-
ged use of CW) (TWG).
– Sampling and Analysis to upgrade objective verification
efforts (TWG).
– Education and Outreach (a joint OPCW-IUPAC project)
on introducing CWC issues in university curricula and on
codes of conduct of chemists and life scientists. Workshops
have been held in Bologna, Oxford and Moscow in 2005,
and in Bologna in 2006. The latter workshop was associa-
ted with an informal SAB meeting.7
For detailed information on the above-mentioned recent
activities of the SAB.6,7,8 Those reports were utilized by the
Open-ended Group, established within the OPCW Techni-
cal Secretariat, in preparing the 2nd Review Conference.
These preparations, marked by the 10th anniversary of the
OPCW and entry into force of the CWC, also involved inter
alia:
– A joint OPCW-IUPAC Workshop on Advances in Scien-
ce and Technology (Zagreb, April, 2007).9
– OPCW Academic Forum (The Hague, September,
2007).10
– OPCW Industry and Assistance Forum (The Hague, No-
vember, 2007).11
– OPCW NGO Forum (The Hague, November 2007).
The Second Review Conference took place in The Hague
from April 7 – 18, 2008. Its character and tasks were defi-
ned simply as “Review operations of the CWC”, consistent
with the requirement of the Convention for the review con-
ferences. The attendance represented 114 SPs, two signa-
tory states (Guinea-Bissau and Israel), three non-signatories
(Angola, Iraq, Lebanon), five international organisations,
and 28 NGOs.
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* The last two (the 5th and 6th) BTWC Review Conferences were unable to
adopt the Additional Protocol on implementation and verification that
could have enhanced it to the level of the CWC with respect to, for exam-
ple, declarations, verification mechanisms, destruction, non-proliferation,
organization and national implementation measures. This addition (which
itself was elaborated by prestigious international NGOs with the basic in-
put of Federation of American Scientists in 1990–91) has been negotiated
at four consecutive BTWC Review Conferences since the early 1990s. It
was finally blocked by the US at the 6th Review Conference in 2006.
Beside general debate, procedural questions and reports of
subsidiary bodies, especially that of the OPCW Scientific
Advisory Board12 dealing with problems of advances in
science and technology and their impact on the Conven-
tion and its implementation, the programme went very
deeply into all problems of reviewing and assessing the ope-
rations of the Convention in all its aspects, including espe-
cially:
1. The role of the CWC in enhancing international peace
and security and in achieving the objectives as set forth in
the preamble of the CWC.
2. Ensuring the universality of the CWC.
3. Implementation of the CWC’s provisions, related to:
(a) General obligations and declarations related thereto.
(b) Destruction of CW and destruction/conversion of
CWPFs.
(c) Verification activities of the OPCW.
(d) Activities not prohibited by the CWC.
(e) National implementation measures.
(f) Consultations, cooperation, and fact-finding.
(g) Assistance and protection against CW.
(h) Economic and technological development.
(i) Articles XII to XV of the CWC and final clauses.
(j) The protection of confidential information.
4. The general functioning of the OPCW.
The Second Review Conference, being very well prepared,
and utilising results of a series of activities carried out within
the framework of, and celebrating the 10th anniversary of,
the CWC’s entry into force in 2007 (as described above),
analysed individual points in a very deep and comprehensi-
ve manner. This is clearly reflected in one central docu-
ment, adopted at the end of the conference13 that will
orient activities in chemical disarmament for the following
five years. Detailed analysis of this document is beyond the
aim of this paper.
Present Role of Engineers and Scientists
in Implementing the Convention
Engineers and scientists and their organisations made major
contributions to negotiating and drafting the CWC and to its
difficult ratification process, thereby enabling its entry into
force. They again are now playing an important role in its
implementation.
The complicated and extensive text of the CWC body and
annexes, many of them connected with implementation
and verification, need precise study, explanation and ac-
ceptance by all segments of society committed to act pur-
suant to its provisions. The experience with implementing
the CWC through national legislative systems has shown
how difficult it is for initially less well-informed people to
understand its provisions, however committed they may be
to taking part in the implementation of those provisions.
The first approach of, for example, those in industry with le-
gal obligations under the treaty, was their frequently ex-
pressed thesis: What do we have to do with prohibition of
any weapons – that is purely a military issue? It was and still
is necessary to do much work in education and outreach on
national as well as international levels, starting with educa-
ting officials of national authorities and the preparation of
national implementation measures with respect to their le-
gal and technical aspects.
The practice of implementation, especially in countries
possessing CW (and in countries where old CW are found),
deals at present with very dangerous operations of CW de-
struction and disposal. The CWC leaves full responsibility in
the choice of effective technology to the SPs but does not
allow such environmentally barbaric methods of destruc-
tion/disposal, routinely used still in the 1970s, such as sea
dumping, earth burial, open-pit burning or blasting. Deve-
lopment of cost-effective and safe technologies for the
whole process of destruction (starting from storage sites up
to the disposal of metal scrap and non toxic end-products)
under domestic legal workplace safety and environmental
standards are amongst the important international coopera-
tive tasks of the scientific and technological communities.
Development of verification technologies utilising the most
sophisticated instrumental analytical techniques for detec-
tion, identification and determination of trace amounts or
concentrations of toxic chemicals, their metabolites, break-
down products and excess impurities in other industrial
chemicals, or under environmental conditions and in biolo-
gical samples, is another serious task necessary for verifying
implementation of all provisions of the CWC.
Assistance and Protection are also amongst the main pillars
of the CWC. These terms imply providing both equipment
and know-how in detection and monitoring, decontamina-
tion, protection of personnel and medical treatments to
those SPs that are experienced in this domain, and also to
SPs with less or even zero experience with armed forces
and the protection of the population. This area is gaining in-
creased importance, not only because of possible military
use of CW by non-SPs but also because of the increasing
peacetime threats that modern industrialised society poses,
including possible chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear terrorist attacks.
Impact of Scientific and Technological
Development on the Convention
and the Future Role of Engineers
and Scientists
Both Review Conferences, and especially the reports pre-
pared by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, identified
positive and negative aspects of the impact of scientific and
technological development on the CWC and its implemen-
tation.
Consistent with these views it is possible to formulate the
role of engineers and scientists and their organisations in
the future implementation of the CWC. In the first instance
there is their engagement in finishing the complete and safe
destruction of CW stockpiles, and the destruction or con-
version of the CWPFs. Then there is their involvement in as-
suring the non-proliferation of CW, i. e. verifying non-pro-
duction by the peaceful chemical industry of potential CW,
taking into account threats and benefits posed by scientific
and technological development.
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Potential threats arise from scientific and technological de-
velopments because of the accelerated pace of production
of new toxic chemicals, from new synthetic methods and
from the changing face of the chemical industry.
One present threat lies already in the inconsistency of the
CWC with regard to riot-control agents. Even though law
enforcement and domestic riot control are explicitly men-
tioned among the purposes not prohibited, the particular
CWC wording (Article I, paragraph 5) prohibiting use of
riot-control agents as a method of warfare is generally un-
derstood as ipso facto exempting these agents from the de-
finition of toxic chemicals (for the purposes of the CWC);
this has consequences for the current verification regime –
even these known agents are unscheduled. This is a signifi-
cant loophole in the CWC, allowing its possible circumven-
tion because R&D and production of such chemicals are
outside routine verification regimes. One can imagine legi-
timate search for new effective and safe (how safe?) irritants
and various kinds of incapacitants based on a wide spec-
trum of toxicological action (calmatives, algogens, various
bioregulators either isolated or of synthetic origin, influen-
cing some biogenic processes associated with the nervous
system) for policing purposes, but there are also tempta-
tions in the direction of the uncontrolled development and
production of means that sometime might be used on bat-
tlefields.
This problem of so-called non-lethal agents is a real, current
and very serious problem. Every toxicologist knows that the
toxic effect on, or response of, an organism is dose- (expo-
sure-) dependent. This means that so-called non-lethal
agents do not exist at all. The safety index of irritants and
other harassing agents depends on the difference between
the statistically determined dose (involving both concentra-
tion and exposure time) that has intolerable effects and the
dose that causes death. This index of safety should be as big
as possible, but it cannot by its very nature be unlimited.
That is why the concept of ‘non-lethality’ is inevitably im-
precise.
Future threats arise mainly from the changing face of synt-
hetic and manufacturing methods for production of both
scheduled and new (unscheduled) toxic compounds. These
new threats come primarily from the rapid pace of deve-
lopment in bio-molecular science (e.g. genomics and pro-
teomics) and in chemical synthesis (i. e. combinatorial
chemistry) that can produce toxic chemicals for potential
misuse. These methods enable the very rapid syntheses of
extensive series of compounds with ‘tailored’ structures,
the effects of which are predicted theoretically on the basis
of molecular engineering or architecture. Thus, what took
months or years to produce in the classical era of organic
synthesis in the middle of the 20th century can today be
achieved within days or weeks.
We are now faced also with the changed character of the
chemical industry. Many parts of the chemical industry
operate with multipurpose batch facilities whose produc-
tion can readily be switched from one product to another.
The potential of producing toxic chemicals is also consi-
derably enhanced by the use of microreactors producing
large volumes in small plants. Globalisation of this industry
therefore necessitates reviewing the verification regime of
‘other chemical production facilities’ producing discrete
organic chemicals. The number of such facilities (see Table
2) that are currently almost without international supervi-
sion shows the importance of this issue.
The ever-growing range of toxic chemicals and new proces-
ses of small-scale syntheses increase also the threat of che-
mical terrorism.
The main benefits of scientific and technological develop-
ment can be expected in the development of progressive
analytical methods and relevant high technology instru-
mentation. Many modern separation techniques (such as
gas chromatography and high performance liquid chroma-
tography) coupled with identification techniques (such as
mass spectrometry) and other spectrophotometric methods
(such as Fourier transform infra-red spectroscopy), and lin-
ked with computerised data-libraries accessible on-line,
have been introduced into the OPCW-designated laborato-
ries; some of these techniques are used routinely in port-
able or mobile equipment for on-site inspections. The
problems are to keep up with the rapid development of po-
tential (mainly unscheduled) toxic chemicals, technical up-
grading of equipment, analysis of toxins and biological
samples, conservation and transportation of samples for
off-site analysis and the like. It is also desirable to introduce
utilisation of automated analytical techniques. This includes
remote (off-site) methods with automatic data transmission
in real time to reduce the burden of continuous on-site pre-
sence of inspectors verifying destruction of CW. Verifica-
tion efforts also need to shift to counter the much greater
future threat by ensuring the non-production of CW by the
increasing and spreading peaceful chemical industry faciliti-
es that manufacture discrete organic chemicals (see the bot-
tom line of Table 2). The multifaceted technical issue of
verification and its many practical applications is beyond
the scope of this article, but it can be concluded that, if the
power of modern analytical science were to be used to its
full extent, all analytical requirements of the CWC could be
achieved.
Another very significant contribution of scientific and tech-
nological development that should be widely utilised in fu-
ture implementation of Article X (relating to Assistance and
Protection), includes the delivery of means and of know-
-how in the continuously developing areas of:
– Detection, identification and monitoring (point and stand-
-off detection, i. e. simple means, automatic alarms, re-
connaissance vehicles, stand-off sensors, data transmission,
field-portable and mobile laboratories and sets).
– Decontamination (means and methods for decontamina-
tion of personnel, decontamination of equipment and ma-
teriel, decontamination of stationary objects, decontamina-
tion and treatment of water).
– Protection of personnel (protective masks, suits, accesso-
ries and other means for armies, civil and population pro-
tection, for general and specialist use, shelters, filtration,
ventilation and special equipment, filter-ventilated combat
and transport vehicles.
– Treatment of intoxication (first aid methods and means,
such as antidotes, syringes, auto injectors and other equip-
ment, medical treatment methods and means, therapeutic
procedures, equipment, evacuation and rescue systems,
rescue and evacuation vehicles).
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Other challenges of scientific and technological develop-
ment are associated with the work of the OPCW, its Tech-
nical Secretariat and with education and outreach. Those
issues also should be matters of interest to concerned
engineers and scientists and their organisations.
Conclusions
The international community of engineers and scientists, in-
cluding individual experts directly engaged in the negotia-
tions as well as professional organisations, institutions and
NGOs of concerned scientists, has played a positive role
from the early stages of negotiations on the CW ban,
through advanced negotiations of the CWC, preparations
for its entry into force and during the first period of imple-
menting the CWC.14
Operations of the Chemical Weapons Convention that
most probably would not exist without valuable input of ex-
pertise by the scientific and technological communities are
proceeding generally satisfactorily,* judged according to the
status of its implementation by the 188 States Parties and
through verification by the Organisation for Prohibition of
the Chemical Weapons in The Hague. The First Review
Conference stressed the importance of achieving worldwi-
de universality in order to totally eliminate the dark legacy
of past chemical arsenals once and forever, to prevent
threats and to utilise the benefits of scientific and technolo-
gical development for the implementation of the CWC in
the foreseeable future. These positive trends were confir-
med by the outcome of the Second Review Conference in
2008. The future implementation of the CWC involves an
essential active role for scientific and technological experti-
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* Except for the delayed schedule of destruction by the main CW posses-
sors.
SAÝETAK
Konvencija o zabrani kemijskoj oruÞja i uloga inÞenjera i znanstvenika
J. Matoušek
Kemijsko oruÞje, kao i cijela vojna tehnologija, povezana je s aktivnostima inÞenjera i znanstveni-
ka. Meðutim, kemijsko oruÞje se razlikuje u odnosu na druge vojne tehnologije po tome, što je
ono nastalo i prvi puta masovno upotrijebljeno izravnim sudjelovanjem znamenitih kemièara.
Opisan je znatan doprinos inÞenjera i znanstvenika te njihovih organizacija pregovorima o kemi-
jskom razoruÞanju, ukljuèujuæi i stvaranje (pisanje) Konvencije o zabrani kemijskog oruÞja.
Razmatra se njihova sadašnja i buduæa uloga u provedbi Konvencije uzimajuæi u obzir ugroze i
dobrobit koje donose napredak znanosti i tehnologije, naglašavajuæi neovisnu ekspertizu Znan-
stvenog savjeta Organizacije za zabranu kemijskog oruÞja.
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